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TRIBAL PROPERTY INTERESTS IN EXECUTIVE-ORDER
RESERVATIONS: A COMPENSABLE INDIAN RIGHT
WHETHER the United States must compensate Indian tribes for the taking
of land in reservations created by and held under Executive order principally
depends on whether Congress has "recognized" tribal property interests in
such land. After a century and a half of sovereign non-consent to suit,' the
Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 extended jurisdiction of the Court of
Claims to Indian claims against the Government accruing after 1946 and aris-
ing under the "Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States, or Execu-
tive Orders of the President .... ,,2 This general grant of jurisdiction, how-
ever, incorporates a requirement that a claim be based on legal or equitable
rights.3 And the Supreme Court has held, in cases involving land taken dur-
1. Prior to 1946, Indian tribes could sue the United States, which may not be sued
without its consent, see United States v. Clarke, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436 (1834) (dictum),
only if the federal government consented to suit in a special jurisdictional statute, see,
e.g., Act of Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 686, 49 Stat. 801.
2. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1055 (1946) (now 28 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (1958)). (Emphasis added.) The act created a Claims Commission to hear among
other Indian claims, those accruing prior to August 14, 1946, and "arising from the tak-
ing by the United States ...of lands owned or occupied by the claimant without the
payment of... compensation," and those "based upon fair and honorable dealings that
are not recognized by any existing rule of law and equity." Indian Claims Commission
Act §§ 2(4)-(5), 60 Stat 1050 (1946), 25 U.S.C. §§ 70a(4)-(5) (1958). All Indian
claims accruing prior to 1946 and not filed with the Commission within five years after
passage of the act were barred. Section 12, 60 Stat. 1052 (1946), 25 U.S.C. § 70k (1958);
see Note, 15 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 388 (1947); Note, 69 HARv. L. Rm. 119, 147-5L
(1955). The Commission was created (1) to eliminate the large backlog of pre-1946
claims unheard as a result of sovereign nonconsent to suit, (2) to do away with the pro-
longed, expensive, and inequitable process of obtaining special jurisdictional statutes, (3)
to relieve Congress of a burden to 'which it was illsuited, and (4) to obtain a uniform
interpretation of Indian land interests. HR. REP. No. 1466, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. (1945) ;
Hearings ot H.R. 1198 and H.R. 1341 Before the House Commnittec on Indian Affairs,
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1945) (to end harassment of Congress) ; id. at 88 (took over
90 years to get special jurisdictional statute and recovery) ; U.S. DV'r or Tm INTEx o ,
FEDERAL INDLAN LAw 347-48 (1958) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL IxrnN.- LAw] (variety
of standards in pre-1946 special jurisdictional statutes).
3. Indian Claims Commission Act, ch. 959, § 24, 60 Stat. 1055 (1946), incorporates
by reference the jurisdictional requisites of Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 145, 36 Stat.
1136. The incorporating language is omitted from the Judiciary Act codification in'the
United States Code "as unnecessary since the Court of Claims manifestly ... will deter-
mine whether a petition... states a cause of action." Reviser's -Note following 23 U.S.C.
§ 1505 (1952) (now following 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (1958)).
The jurisdiction of the Court of tClaims, unlike that of the Indian Claims Commission,
does not extend to claims "not recognized by any existing rule of law and equity.' See
note 2 smpra. Compare Otoe & Missouria Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 Ct Cl.
593, 131 F. Supp. 265, cert. denied, 350 U.S. 848 (1955), wtith Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v.
Uaited States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
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ing the nineteenth century, that Indian tribes have neither legal nor equitable
rights to Executive-order lands.4 Moreover, 'both the Supreme Court and a
federal district court have noted obiter, without qualification as to the date a
claim accrued, that an Executive order creating an Indian reservation confers
only a right of use or occupancy subject to the pleasure of Congress, which
may terminate such rights without legal liability for compensation. r If these
decisions control property claims accruing after 1946 and arising under Ex-
ecutive order, the apparent protection afforded an historic and important
source of Indian property interests by extension of court jurisdiction to claims
arising under "Executive Orders of the President" is rendered illusory.0
Indian tribes " in the United States, except in Alaska, reside on reservations
created 'by treaty, statute, or Executive order. Originally, reservations were,
for the most part, established by treaty.8 In 1871, however, Congress pro-
hibited further use of the treaty power in Indian affairs," and the President,
assuming the function formerly exercised by Congress, thereafter set aside
twenty-three million acres of the public domain by Executive order for the
use and occupancy of Indian tribes.10 In 1919, when most tribal Indians were
settled on reservations, Congress forbade further use of the Executive order
4. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942) ; Confederated Bands
of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169 (1947).
5. Hynes v. Grimes Packing Co., 337 U.S. 86, 103 (1949) (dictum); Healing v. Jones,
174 F. Supp. 211, 216 (D. Ariz. 1959) (dictum).
6. Executive orders have been used in Indian affairs almost exclusively for the crea-
tion or modification of reservations and Indian property interests therein. See 1 KAi^PLER,
INDiAN AFFAns: LAWS AND TREATIES 801-936 (1.904) [hereinafter cited as KAPPLER].
The five volumes of Kappler collect all executive orders relating to Indian affairs up to
1939. Executive orders issued pursuant to 24 Stat. 388 (1887), 25 U.S.C. § .331 (1958),
and 34 Stat. 325-26 (1906), 25 U.S.C. § 391 (1958), however, extended the trust period
of restricted alienation for land allotted to individual Indians under the Indian General
Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 336, 339, 341-42,
348-49, 381 (1958). See, e.g., orders collected in 4 KAPPLER 1001-56.
7. In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), Indian tribes were
determined to be "domestic dependent nations" under exclusive federal jurisdiction, yet
retaining rights of sovereignty not' expressly altered by Congress. The members of these
tribes as determined- by regulation of the tribe and the Secretary of Interior, see FEDERAL
INDIAN LAW 413-23, are tribal Indians subject to the privileges and restrictions of tribal
law and federal Indian legislation. Any tribal Indian may renounce his tribal ties, id. at
419, and leave the tribal reservation to become a citizen with rights and duties identical
to non-Indian citizens. This Note is concerned only with Indian tribes and their members.
8. FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 138-39; 67 CONG. REc. 10913 (1926).
9". 16 Stat. 566 (1871.), 25 U.S:C. § 71 (1958). This statute was passed, at House
insistence, to end Senate control over Indian affairs. WALKER, TnE INDrAN; QuEsTIoN 11-
12 (1874); SCHIM.CxEBIER, OFFICE OF INDIAN AFFAIMRS 56-58 (1927) (both reprinted In
FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 211-12).
10. H.R. R'. No. 2503, 82d 'Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1953) ; 67 CoNG. REQ 10913 (1926);
Hearings on H.R. 9133 Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Indian
Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1926) ; Hearings on S. 1722 and S. 3159 Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 73, 75-76
(1926) [hereinafter cited as 1926 Senate Hearings I].
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to create reservations,11 and subsequent minor withdrawals from the public
domain were made by statuteY To settle Indian property rights in Alaska,
Congress, in 1936, delegated authority to the Secretary of Interior to desig-
nate reservations without additional statutory ratification. 13 Since 1871, there-
fore, the principal source of tribal property interests has been the Executive
order.14
The legal nature of Indian property interests in Executive-order reserva-
tions ultimately derives from the "right of conquest or discovery.", Under
11. 41 Stat. 34 (1919), 43 U.S.C. § 150 (1958). This statute extended a prior pro-
hibition applicable only to lands in Arizona and New Mexico. 40 Stat. 570 (1918), 25
U.S.C. § 211 (1958). Senators from these states feared the continued expansion of federal
park, forest, and Indian reservations. 1926 Senate Hearings I, at 52. Since the 1919 pro-
hibition was a part of legislation granting tribal Indians valuable mineral rights, the pro-
hibition was probably enacted to prevent further extension of these rights without con-
gressional approval. Compare 44 Stat. 1347 (1927), 25 U.SC. § 393d (1958), enacted to
prevent revocation of existing Executive-order reservations except by statute in order to
protect Indian property interests. Hearings on H.R. 15021 Before the House Committee
on Indi an Affairs, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1927) [hereinafter cited as 1927 House Hear-
ings]. No revocation of an Executive-order Indian reservation in existence in 197 has
been made.
12. After 1919, additions to existing reservations were made through temporary with-
drawal by the Secretary of the Interior followed by statutory ratification. See, e.g., Act
of May 21, 1926, ch. 357, 44 Stat 614; S. REP. No. 725, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) ;
Act of June 2, 1926, ch. 434, 44 Stat 679; S. ReP. No. 361, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
Statutes constitute a minor source of Indian property interests, H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 60 (1953).
13. 49 Stat 120 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958) ; see note 70 infra and accompany-
ing text.
14. Of the 23 million acres set aside by Executive order, see note 10 supra and ac-
companying text, approximately 12 million have been allotted as restricted fees to in-
dividual Indians under the authority of the Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388
(1887), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1958). Nine million acres were consolidated by
statute into the Navaho reservation. Act of June 14, 1934, ch. 521, 48 Stat 960. Over two
million acres of tribal land are presently held under Executive order only. See H.R. RF'.
No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 60-74 (1953).
15. The "right of conquest or discovery" was first stated in dictum by Chief Justice
Marshall in Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), and reiterated in
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S.
(9 Pet) 711, 734-35 (1835) ; Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States,
324 U.S. 335 (1945). The language of the early cases was ambiguous, however, and it
was -not clear whether conquest gave the United States the right to take land claimed by
aboriginal title without compensation or the exclusive right to purchase. See Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 US. (6 Pet.) 515, 545 (1932) ("discovey ... gave the exclusive right
to purchase, but did not found that right on a denial of the possessor to sell") ; Mitchel
v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 745 -(1835) ("their [the Indians] right of occu-
-pancy is considered as sacred as the fee-simple of the whites"). In 1946, the Supreme
-Court held, in a case arising under a special jurisdictional statute, that the United States
is constitutionally required to compensate ,Indians for the taking of land claimed by ab-
original title. United States v. Alcea Band of Tillanooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). The
Court's statement, "By this Act Congress neither admitted nor denied liability ... . No
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this doctrine, absolute title to all land occupied by Indian tribes vested in the
United States as a conquering nation. The tribes retain, however, a right of
use and occupancy legally valid against all 'but the Government, which, 'by an
act of extinguishment, may take the land without compensation. But congres-
sional "recognition" of the right of use and occupancy converts it into a com-
pensable interest--equitable title.1 6 Treaties establishing reservations consti-
tute such acts of "recognition," and vest permanent equitable title to the land
in the tribe, with legal title 'held in trust -by the United States."
But treaty ratification is not the only manner in which Congress can con-
vert a tribe's right of use and occupancy into equitable title. Thus, Siouxv
Tribe of Indians v. United States,18 while holding that the Executive has no
inherent power to give Indian tribes compensable property interests, 0 appar-
ently accepted two theories whereby tribes may obtain vested rights in Ex-
ecutive-order reservations. First, the Executive may acquire power to vest
Indian property interests from indirect congressional delegation: congressional
acquiescence in the Executive practice of establishing reservations coupled
with congressional understanding that such establishment vested rights in the
new right or cause of action is created. A merely moral claim is not made a legal one,"
id. at 45, indicates that allowance of the claim was based not on a statutory direction to
pay, but a constitutionally compensable interest; see Note, 60 HARv. L. Rlv. '165 (1947).
A lower federal court so interpreted the decision. Miller v. United States, 159 F.2d 997
(9th Cir. 1947). But in a subsequent decision concerning the interest due on the claim
allowed in Alcea I, the Supreme Court, disallowing interest, implied that its prior decision
was based only on a legislative direction to pay. See United States v. Alcea Band of
Tillamooks, 341 U.S. 48 (1951). If Alcea I had been based on any interest compensable
under the fifth amendment, the 'Court would have had to allow interest on the claim-
some $14 million, id. at 49. In 1954, the Supreme Court held that Congress could take
land claimed by aboriginal title without compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955). The Indian Claims Commission has granted recovery to
Indian tribes for takings of land held under aboriginal Indian title. Otoe & Missouria
Tribe of Indians v. United States, 131 Ct. CI. 593, 131 F. Supp. 265, cert. denied, 350
U.S. 848 (1955).
For general discussions of Indian title, see F. S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32
MINN. L. REv. 28 (1947); FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 593-601.
16. "There is no particular form for congressional recognition of Indian right of
permanent occupancy. It may be established in a variety of ways but there must be the
definite intention by congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely
permissive occupation." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 278-79
(1.955).
17. Compensation for the taking of "recognized" tribal land was granted in United
States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes of Indians, 304 U.S. 119 (1938) ; United States v.
Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 304 U.S. 11.1 (1938) ; Shoshone Tribe of Indians v. United
States, 299 U.S. 476 (1937) ; United States v. (Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 103 (1934) ; Yank-
ton Sioux Tribe v. United States, 272 U.S. 351 (1926); United States v. MIle Lac Band
of Chippawa Indians, 229 U.S. 498 (1913). See also Coos 'Bay Indian Tribe v. United
States, 87 Ct. Cl. 143, 153 (1938) (an unratified treaty not "recognition").
18. 316 U.S. 317 (1942).




Indians.2° Under this theory, the Indians would acquire compensable property
interests when the Executive order creating the reservation is issued. Second,
a statute may constitute recognition of tribal property interests in a reserva-
tion defined by Executive order and in existence at the passage of the stat-
ute.2 1 Under this theory, tribal property interests would become compensable
with passage of the statute constituting recognition. Applying these theories
to the facts of Sioux--an 1884 taking of land added to a reservation by Ex-
ecutive order in 1875-the Court considered the effect of the Indian General
Allotment Act,2 2 which 'had authorized the President to allot a restricted fee
simple to any individual Indian residing on a treaty, statutory, or Executive-
order reservation, and held that neither indirect delegation nor recognition
had occurred.2
Although between 1887 and 1919, when the Executive order in Indian af-
fairs was abolished, Congress did not directly or indirectly delegate authority
to the Executive to create vested Indian interests in Executive-order reser-
vations, the content and legislative -history of a 1927 statute providing for the
lease of oil and gas rights in such reservations indicate that Congress intended
that statute to be an act of recognition. The statute provides:
Unalloted lands within the limits of any reservation or withdrawal created
by Executive order for Indian purposes or for the use or occupancy of
any Indians or tribe may be leased for oil and gas mining purposes in
accordance with the provisions contained in the Act of May 29, 1924
(Forty-third Statutes, page 244) [leasing act for treaty reservations].
20. 316 U.S. at 326. The origin of this doctrine was United States v. Midwest Oil
Co., 236 U.S. 459 (1915), which held that by virtue of a long-established practice of
creating Indian and military reservations by Executive order the President had power to
withdraw lands from the public domain in order to immunize them from a leasing stat-
ute. See Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923). Previous lower court decisions had
held that reservations created by the Executive were not subject to general leasing stat-
utes, McFadden v. Mountain View Min. & fill. 'Co., 97 Fed. 670 (9th Cir. 1899), rcv'd
a) jurisdictional grounms, 180 U.S. 533 (1901); Gibson v. Anderson, 131 Fed. 39 (9th
Cir. 1904).
21. The court did not discuss this theory of congressional "recognition" in detail since
the statute upon which the plaintiff relied, the Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat.
388 (1887), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 331 (1958), was not passed until three years after
the land in question was returned to the public domain. 316 U.S. at 330. As argued by
the appellee: "The general allotment act ratified and confirmed Executive Orders creat-
ing Indian reservations which were in effect on the date of the act, February 8, 1887."
Brief for the Appellee, p. 17, Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317
(1942). The court replied in dictum that the statute "did not amount to a recognition of
tribal ownership of the [Executive order] lands [referred to in the Act] ... ." 316 U.S.
at 330.
22. 24 Stat. 388 (1887), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-34, 336, 339, 341-42, 348-49,
381 (1958).
23. Prior to Sioux Tribe, it had been believed that the doctrine of Midwest Oil, in
addition to confirming Executive power to set aside land for the use of the Indians, see
note 20 supra, also confirmed Executive power to vest a compensable property interest in
the tribe, see 34 Ops. ATiY GEN. 171 (1924).
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. . . [T]he proceeds . . . shall .be deposited in the Treasury of the
United States to the credit of the tribe of Indians for whose benefit the
reservation or withdrawal was created or who are using and occupying
the land .... 24
Passage of this statute was occasioned by conflicting interpretations of a
1920 act which provided for the lease of oil and gas rights in "land ... owned
by the United States. '25 Applications for leases of Executive-order lands
were granted by the Secretary of the Interior on the ground that equitable
as well as legal title was in the Government. 20 But Attorney General Harlan
Fiske Stone ruled that Executive-order reservations were not subject to lease
under the statute because (1) the act clearly did not apply to treaty or statu-
tory reservations and neither the courts nor Congress had ever made a dis-
tinction as to the character and extent of Indian rights in treaty, statutory,
or Executive-order reservations; and (2) Executive orders probably vested
an equitable fee in the Indians.2 The Attorney General's opinion was over-
ruled by a district court, which 'held that legal and equitable title was in the
United States ;28 and the Court of Appeals, without opinion, certified questions
to the Supreme Court.29 The suit was mooted by passage of the 1927 statute.
The legislative history of the 1927 statute spanned three annual sessions of
Congress-from 1925 to 1927. In 1925, a 'bill providing that royalties -from
gas and oil leases in Executive-order reservations be split among the Indian
tribes, states, and federal government was passed 'by the Senate 'but tabled in
the House on a procedural point of order.30 In 1926, a bill, substantially the
24. 44 Stat. 1347 (1927), 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-e (1958).
25. Mineral Lands 'Leasing Act, 41. Stat. 437 (1920), as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-
229 (1958).
26. E. M. Harrison, 49 Interior Land Dec. 139 (1922).
27. 34 Ops. ATr'y GEN. 171 (1924). A third ground for Stone's opinion was that
general legislation does not apply to Indian territory in the absence of an express stipu-
lation or clear intention in the legislative history. Id. at 172-75, citing Ex parte Crow
Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883).
28. United States v. Harrison, Equity No. 8288, D. Utah, March 3, 1925, reprinted
in Hearings on H.R. 9133 Before a Subconmittee of the House Committee on lndian
Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 82-83 (1926). Defendant had received a permit to search
for oil on an Executive-order reservation and in reliance on the opinion of the Secretary
of the Interior, note 26 supra, incurred substantial expenditures. The Attorney General's
office brought suit in the district court subsequent to the Attorney General's opinion,
note 27 supra, to cancel the exploration permits. The exact rationale of the court's hold-
ing for defendant-permittee is unclear; for in addition to stating that legal and equitable
title was in the Government, the court Onphasized that (1) the land in question had
never been occupied by Indians, and- (2) the hardship to the defendant who had in good
faith incurred expenditures out-weighed the "highly technical" argument of the United
States.
29. United States v. Harrison, No. 872, U.S., Oct. Term 1.925, reprinted in 1927
House Hearings 10-11.
30. S. 876, 68th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1924-1925). The history of this bill is com-
plex. As first reported from the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, S. REP. No. 669,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. (1924), and passed by the Senate, 66 CoNG. REc. 999 (1924), all
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same as the legislation eventually enacted, giving all royalties to the tribes
was passed by both House and Senate,31 but vetoed by the President.32 The
statute, in its present form, was introduced, passed by House and Senate, and
signed by the President in 1927.33 The royalty provision vitally affects the
question of whether Indian tribes have title to Executive-order reservations.
Congressional allocation of royalties to the state and federal governments as
provided in the 1925 bill implied that complete ownership of Executive-order
land was in the United States. 34 Retention of the entire proceeds in trust for
the Indians, as provided in the final statute, implied congressional recognition
of equitable title in the tribe.35
royalties from gas and oil leases on Executive-order reservations were to go to the In-
dian tribe. The bill was amended and passed in the House to allow the states to tax the
proceeds. H.R. REP. No. 1254, 68th Cong., 2d Sess. (1925) ; 66 CONG. REC. 2234 (1925).
The House amendment was amended by the Senate to provide that 371,1% of the lease
royalties go to the State, 523/2% to the federal government, and 10% to the tribes. Id. at
2799. The purpose of the Senate amendment was to prevent the states from overtaxing
the tribes. Id. at 5433 (remarks of 'Mr. Hayden); Hearings on H.R. 9133 Before a Sub-
committee of the House Comnittee on Indian Affairs, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 26-27 (1926)
(amended to protect Indians). The House objected to the amended bill, which then went
to joint conference for study not of the original text but of the amendment When the
bill was reported from conference to the House, H.R. IP. No. 1637, 68th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1925), a point of order was raised on the ground that the joint conference exceeded the
scope of its authority by altering text upon which both Houses had previously agreed.
The point of order was sustained and the bill tabled. 66 CoNG. REc 5433-34 (1925). The
point of order was raised by pro-Indian legislators. 1926 Senate Hearings I, at 55. This
opposition is at first glance surprising since the royalty splitting provision was added to
protect the Indians. That the title implications of this provision was the ground of op-
position emerges from hearings held the following year. See notes 34-35 infra.
31. 67 CONG. R. 10912 (S. 4152 read into the Record) (1926); id. at 10925 (passed
by Senate) ; id. at 11397 (passed by House, with minor amendment); id. at 11530 (House
amendment accepted by Senate).
32. S. Doc. No. 156, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926) (President's veto message). Under
the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, 41 Stat. 437 (1920), as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-229
(1958), and prior to the Attorney General's opinion holding that the act did not apply
to Executive-order reservations, see note 27 supra, there were approximately 400 appli-
cations filed for exploration permits on Executive order land, 20 of 'which were granted.
The President believed that § 3 of S. 4152, supra note 31, designed to treat equitably per-
mittees who had incurred exploration expenses, discriminated between applicants and per-
mittees. He therefore vetoed the bill, but expressed his willingness to sign another bill
eliminating this discrimination. S. Dor. No. 156, supra. See also 1927 House Hearings
14-15 (remarks of Commissioner Burke).
33. 67 CoNa. Rm. 2793 (passed by Senate) (1927) ; id. at 4581 (passed by House);
id. at.552 9 (signed by President); 44 Stat. 1347 (1927), 25 U.S.C. §§ 398a-e (1958).
34. See 1926 Senate Hearings I, at 71; Hearings on- S. 3159 and S. 4152 Before the
Senate Committee on India. Affairs, 69th 'Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1926) (remarks of Senator
La Follette: "If the Government can divide these royalties it settles tie question that the
rights of the Indians are invalid.") [hereinafter cited as 1926 Senate Hearings HI.
35. 1926 Senate Hearings II, at 21 (remarks of Senator Bratton, "If we give the
Indians all of it [the royalties], we are unqualifiedly recognizing their title to all Execu-
tive order lands and can never recede from that position.").
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This relationship between title to Executive-order reservations and alloca-
tion of lease royalties was carefully considered by the Senate in 1926 and the
House in 1927. At Senate hearings resulting in recommendation of the 1926
bill,30 the chairman of the Committee on Indian Affairs stated:
This is a very important bill, because for the first time we are really
recognizing that the Indians have a title to Executive-order land .... It
is a matter of doubt at the present time as to what their rights are in
Executive-order lands, but there will 'be no doubts after the passage of
this bill, because I think the passage ...will affirm title in the Indian
tribes.8 7
Senator Bratton, representing the views of those opposed to recognizing In-
dian property interests, requested the committee to recommend an amendment
that the act not be construed to vest title in the Indians. 8 In response, the
committee chairman stated: "[T]he time has come when the Government
ought to confer title on the respective Indian tribes to these Executive-order
lands, and I am willing for this bill to read in such a way as to do that."8 9
36. Bills splitting the royalties were considered by a Subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Indian Affairs. 1926 Senate Hearings I. The full committee then considered
one bill splitting the royalty and one bill giving all the proceeds to the tribes, 1926 Senate
Hearings II, reporting the latter to the Senate floor, S. REP. No. 768, 69th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1926) ; 67 CONG. REc. 8874 (1926).
37. 1926 Senate Hearings II, at 48; see id. at 14 (remarks of Senator Wheeler:
"Congress is not going to say we are giving them a gratuity. Congress is going to say:
We recognize the equities there. We recognize that the Indians, as a matter of equity, are
entitled to that [royalties], and in good conscience we are going to try to give you some-
thing which in our judgment really belongs to you.") ; id. at 21-23 (remarks of Senator
La Follette).
38. Id. at 76; see id. at 10-13, 29-34. Senator 'Bratton's proposed amendment was
similar to provisions contained in two prior statutes, Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat.
62, 63; Act of February 20, 1893, ch. 147, 27 'Stat. 469, 470. The Supreme Court cited
such provisions to support the proposition that Congress did not intend to "recognize"
tribal title to Executive-order lands. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S.
317, 330-31 (1942).
39. 1926 Senate Hearings II, at 78. The chairman wished atthis time to amend the
bill expressly to confer title to Executive-order reservations on the Indian tribes. The
committee believed, however, that such an amendment would precipitate a heated debate
on the title issue in the .Senate. Id. at 78-84. But, as Senator Bratton prophetically pointed
out, "If . . . [the bill] goes to the floor in the present shape [without an amendment
expressly directed to the title issue] it will necessarily provoke that controversy [debate
on the title issue] there." Id. at 82. It was argued at this point in the hearings, id. at,81,
and on several other occasions, 67 CoNG. REc. 10914 (1926) (remarks of Senator Jones),
that- S. 4152 might be passed without touching, the question of title, that is-could create
in the Indians-mineral rights in Executive-order land determinable at will by Congress
without liability for compensation. Members of the committee believed, however, that the
royalties could not be disposed of without settling the title issue. 1926 Senate Hearings
II, at 16-17 (remarks of Senator Kendrick) :
Suppose you have a withdrawal for Indian purposes, and you should proceed to
develop it for oil . .. and then dispose of the royalty .. . to the Indians ....
Then suppose that the withdrawal is again returned to the public domain, you
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Senator Bratton's proposed amendment was rejected by the committee.40 Dur-
ing the subsequent debate on the floor of the Senate, Senator Bratton, intro-
ducing another amendment designed to give protection to persons who applied
for leases in Executive-order reservations under the Mineral Lands Leasing
Act, said: "If the title was in the Indians, my amendment should not be
adopted. If the title to the land was in the Government, the applicants had
the right to file upon the land and should be protected ... in the amendment,
and the amendment should be adopted." 41 Senator La Follette, in opposition
to the proposed amendment, discussed in detail the judicial and legislative
history of Executive-order reservations, concluding "that the right of occu-
pancy is the right of ownership in so far as these Indians are concerned.'
-42
The Senate overwhelmingly endorsed the position of Senator La Follette, re-
jected the amendment, and passed the bill giving all royalties from oil and gas
leases in Executive-order reservations to the Indian tribes. 43
In 1927, the House Committee on Indian Affairs recommended the bill
which eventually passed.44 That the committee regarded the bill as congres-
would have a situation that is impossible, because the resources have been taken out
of the land as the property of one owner, and the land returned to the public
domain as the property of another owner. It seems to me, until that question of a
definite title is ... definitely settled, there is no opportunity to proceed with the
development.
Accord, id. at 82 (Senator Bratton: "... the effect of the bill without this amendment
[see text at note 38 supra] would put Congress conclusively on the record as recognizing
the title of the Indians") ; ibid. (.Senator La Follette: ". . . in so far as this act has to
deal obliquely with the question of title, it seems to me that Congress should take a posi-
tion which looks towards the confirmation of the title of the Indians to these Executive
order lands").
40. Id. at 84.
41, 67 CONG. Rc. 10918 (1926). Senator Bratton believed that if Executive-order
lands were public domain, then the 400 lease applicants under the 1920 General Leasing
Act had a legal right "to file upon the land as they did. ... In that way the question
of title becomes very material . . . ." lbEd. For Senator Bratton's position on Executive-
order lands, see id. at 10913-19 ("If the Indians own the title to these lands so that they
own the minerals under them, the President has vested that title in them by presidential
proclamation in the face of a constitutional provision [art. IV, § 3] vesting that authority
in the Congress.").
42. Id. at 10922. For Senator La Follette's position, see id. at 10920:
... Congress did not intend when it ended the treaty-making power [see note 9
supra and accompanying text] to change the nature of the Indian ownership in
reservations previously created or to be created in the future; and that the Indian
ownership in the case of Executive-order reservations has been recognized by Con-
gress as being identical with the ownership in the case of treaty reservations.
See generally id. at 10920-25.
43. Id. at 10925. See also 68 CoNG. RFrc 2793 (1927) (remarks of Senator Bratton
with respect to the 1926 passage of S. 4125: "I found that the sentiment in the Senate
was overwhelmingly in favor of giving the entire royalty to the Indians ... .
44. H.R. RE. No. 1791, 69th Cong., _d Sess. (1927).
During the 1926 congressional session, House hearings held on a bill splitting the
lease royalties did not cover the title issue. See Hearings on H.R. 9133 Before a Subco,-
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sional recognition of Indian title is evidenced by the following remarks of the
committee chairman:
I think it ought to be plain, and I think it is from the record of the debate
and the original hearings, that the decision of the committee, the majority
of the committee, has been that, regardless of what the Supreme Court
might find the law to have been, there is a duty on the part of Congress
to see that the law shall be such that the rights of the Indians as they
ought to be are protected. If from failure of Congress to act in the past
these rights have oozed out, it is our duty as legislative representatives
and guardians of the Indians to act.
45
Prior to House debate, Representative Sproul objected to consideration of
the bill on the ground that under House rules a disposal of government prop-
erty must first 'be considered by a -Committee of the Whole. 40 After calling
the attention of the House to the importance of the dispute and hearing argu-
ment on both sides of the title issue,47 the Speaker of the House ruled that
the 'bill disposed not of government property but "of lands held in trust for
the Indians . . ."4 During subsequent debate, a member of the Committee
on Indian Affairs, explaining the bill to the House, concluded that "it will
validate Indian title to Executive order reservations and settle the question
for all time."'49 Representative Sproul, opposing passage of the bill, presented
the legislative and judicial 'history of Executive-order reservations in an at-
mittee of the House Committee om Indianm Affairs, 69th 'Cong., 1st Sess. (1926). The bill
was reported to the floor but was returned to committee for amendment conforming it to
the 1926 ,Senate bill granting all royalties to the Indians. See 67 CoNG. Rac. 11379 (1926).
It emerged from committee, however, with the following statement in the House Report:
"Nothing in this bill is intended to in any manner change or alter the ownership or legal
and equitable title to the lands described by its terms." -H.R. REP. No. 763, 69th 'Cong.,
1st Sess. 8 (1926). Compare this with the Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, § 8, 27 Stat. 64.
(This disclaimer clause was omitted from the House Report on the leasing bill in 1927,
H.R. REP. No. 1791, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. (1927)). Nonetheless, the bill was debated on
the floor of the House. Both sides of the title issue were discussed, see 67 CoNG. REc.
11379-97 (1926), and the chairman of the House Committee on Indian Affairs asserted
that the bill would confer title to Executive-order reservations to the Indian tribes: "One
of the principal purposes of this bill is to settle that [title] question in favor of the Indians
and to decide by an act of Congress that they have the legal title to their lands and to
the resources of their lands." Id. at 11381.
45. 1927 House Hearings at 12-13; see id. at 88-89 ("THE CuAnu1,1AN .... we will
enact legislation that will determine that the Indians have a right in this mineral and this
oil. MR. BRIGHAM. You mean create a right now? MR. CHAIRMAN. Create it if it does
not exist, regardless of what the Supreme Court might say as to what the lair is now.");
id. at 113.
46. See 68 CoNG. Rzc. 4569 (1927).
47. Id. at 4569-72.
48. Id. at 4572.
49. Id. at 4575 (remarks of Mr. Frear) ; see id. at 4573-75, 4578-81. See also id. at
4578-79:
MR. GARTER. . . . So far as I know, the courts have never passed upon the
difference between the rights of the Indians in a treaty and Executive order reser-
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tempt to prove that the affected land -was public domain ;O and the House,
with full awareness of the title implications, passed the bill as recommended
by the committee.Y The Senate reaffirmed its 1926 position that the tribes had
equitable title to Executive-order reservations,5 2 and the bill was enacted. In
light of this legislative history, it is apparent that Congress intended the oil
and gas leasing act of 1927 to constitute "recognition" of Indian property in-
terests in reservations established by Executive order; therefore, any subse-
quent taking of such land or rights therein should be accompanied by com-
pensation.53
vation. But let us go a little further into the question than mere legal technicalities
and determine our moral obligation to our wards ....
MR. HASTINGS. Is not the only question involved here whether or not to put
an Executive order reservation on the same footing with a treaty reservation?
MR. CARTER. Yes, that is the question ....
50. Id. at 4576-78. Compare the remarks of Mr. Sproul the previous year, 67 Coxa.
Rc. 11381 (1926) ("The third [type of reservation] was that made by the President
without any legal authority .... It amounts to nothing. It is nothing.").
51. 68 CoNG. REc. 4581 (1927); see id. at 4703-04 (extended remarks of Mr. Mor-
row).
52. See Hearings on S. 4893 Before the Senate Commit tee on Indian, Affairs, 69th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1927) ; 68 CoNG. Rxc. 2793-95 (1927).
53. It might be argued that the 1927 statute could not vest title in the Indian tribes
in the absence of specific words of vesting. Ordinarily, words allegedly creating vested
interests are construed against the grantee of public domain, Dubuque & Pac. R. v.
Litchfield, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 66, 88 (1859), but the general rule in Indian law is that
tribal rights vest when, under all the circumstances of the case, a congressional intention
exists to "recognize" Indian rights of use and occupancy, see Shoshone Tribe of Indians
v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 485 (1937) (treaty language, "set apart for the absolute
and undisturbed use and occupation," conveys full fee for compensation purposes) ; Choate
v. Trapp, 244 U.S. 665, 674-75 (1912) (statutory grant of privilege of tax-exemption
construed to vest a compensable interest if Congress so intended) ; Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553 (1832) (Marshall, CJ.) (treaty reserving lands for "hunting
grounds" interpreted to vest title for all purposes). See also Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S.
1, 1.1 (1899) (treaty language construed in the "sense in which ... [it] would naturally
be understood by the Indians"). The language of Executive orders is similar to that of
treaties. Compare the usual Executive order language-to set aside for "use and occu-
pancy," FDERAL INDIAN LA~v 617-ith treaty language in the Shoshone case, .upra-
"to set apart for the absolute and undisturbed use and occupation." See note 74 infra for
other examples of treaty language.
It might further be argued that statutory language relating to mineral proceeds may
not be construed to recognize complete Indian title to Executive-order lands. But "there
is no particular form for congressional recognition of Indian right of permanent occu-
pancy. It may be established in a variety of ways but there must be the definite intention
by congressional action or authority to accord legal rights, not merely permissive occu-
pation." Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 277-78 (1955). (Emphasis
added.) Using this rule, the Tee-Hit-Ton Court interpreted its earlier decision, United
States v. Alcea Band of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40 (1946). There Congress had passed a
special jurisdictional statute to hear the claims of the Tillamook Indians for the taking
of land reserved by unratified treaties. Neighboring tribes, with ratified treaties, had had
their rights protected. Tee-Hit-Ton interpreted Aiea to mean that the congressional in-
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Interpreting the 1927 statute as an act of recognition is consistent with the
fact that 'Congress has not in practice discriminated between the property in-
terests of tribes residing on treaty and Executive-order reservations." Since
1883, for example, it has given the Indian tribes proceeds from the sale of
metallic minerals and timber under statutes applicable to "lands of any Indian
reservations." 55 And although the Executive has in the past returned Execu-
tive-order reservations -to the public domain without compensation, " when-
ever Congress has reduced or revoked an Executive-order reservation, it has
compensated the affected tribes in the same manner as it compensated for the
taking of treaty lands. 57 Furthermore, -Congress has treated all reservations
alike for purposes of annual appropriations, expenditures of the Bureau of
tention in passing the statute had been to "equalize the Tillamooks with the neighboring
tribes," and therefore the statute was a congressional direction to pay. 348 U.S. at 284.
So, although (1.) the jurisdictional statute was strictly limited to "legal and equitable"
claims, and (2) under Tee-Hit-Ton the Tillamooks claim, based as it was on original
Indian title, was neither legal nor equitable, the Tillamooks recovered. Thus, under Alcea,
as read by Tee-Hit-Ton, statutory language is ignored to give determinative weight to
congressional intent.
54. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United .States, 316 U.S. 317, 326, 328, 330-31 (1942),
states that Congress believed a difference to exist between treaty and Executive-order
reservations, not that Congress acted as if a difference existed. Indeed, the only statutory
language indicating congressional belief that Indians did not have vested rights in Ex-
ecutive-order reservations is contained in two statutes stating that "nothing herein con-
tained shall be construed as recognizing title or ownership of said Indians." But these
same statutes contain provisions granting the tribes compensation for the takings of Ex-
ecutive-order land. Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 64; Act of 'Feb. 20, 1893, ch. 147,
27 Stat. 470; see 67 CONG. REc. 10917 (1926) (remarks of Senator Curtis that he In-
cluded these compensation provisions in the belief that the Indians held equitable title).
55. 22 Stat 590 (1883), as amended, 25 U.S.C. § 155 (1958) ; 25 Stat. 673 (1899),
25 U.S.C. § 196 (1958); 36 Stat. 857 (1-910), 25 U.S.C. 407 (1958); 41 Stat. 33
(1919), as amended, § 399 (1958). (Emphasis added in all statutes.) An exception is a
reservation leasing act, 26 Stat. 795 (1891), 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1958), interpreted to apply
to treaty and statutory reservations, see Uintah Lands, 25 Interior Land Dec. 408, 411-
12 (1897). This act, however, did not imply that mineral rights in Executive-order reser-
vations could be leased under the general mineral leasing acts for the public domain.
McFadden v. Mountain View Min. & Mill. Co., 97 Fed. 670, 673 (9th Cir. 1899), rev'd
on jurisdictional grounds, 180 U.S. 533 (1901) ; Gibson v. Anderson, 131 Fed. 39, 41 (9th
Cir. 1904). 43 Stat. 244 (1924), 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1958), also provided for gas and oil
leases only in treaty and statutory reservations, but was specifically extended to Execu-
tive-order reservations by the 1927 statute to achieve a uniform treatment of Indian
property interests. See 44 Stat. 1347 (1927), 25 U.S.C. § 398a (1958) ; -notes 42, 49 supra.
56. Sioux Tribe of Indians v. United States, 316 U.S. 317, 330 (1942).
57. See 67 CoNr. REc. 10920-21 (1926) (remarks of Senator La Follette with respect
to compensation by acts of Congress for takings of Executive-order lands) ; 1926 Senate
Hearings II, at "57-58; note 42 supra. Contra, Act of May 29, 1908, ch. 216, § 25, 35 Stat.
457. Compare Act of July 1, 1892, ch. 140, 27 Stat. 62, and Act of Feb. 20, 1893, ch. 147,
27 Stat. 469 (reduction in size of Executive-order reservations), with Act of April 23,
1904, ch. 1484, 33 Stat. 254, and Act of March 3, 1905, ch. 1452, 33 Stat. 1016 (reduction
in size of treaty reservations).
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Indian Affairs,s permanent capital improvements on reservations, 0 and ter-
mination of -federal control over specific tribes.c0
A 1958 statute giving a federal district court jurisdiction over a quiet-title
action between two Indian tribes occupying an Executive-order reservation ('
might be cited as evidence militating against interpretation of the 1927 oil and
gas leasing statute as an act of recognition. For in addition to extending juris-
diction to the Arizona District Court, the 1958 statute declared the disputed
lands "to be held in trust" for the litigant tribes.02 If the oil and gas leasing
statute of 1927 constituted an act of recognition vesting property interests in
tribes on all Executive-order reservations then in existence, that part of the
1958 jurisdictional statute declaring the lands of a particular Executive-order
reservation to be held in trust for resident tribes would be supererogatory.
Arguably, therefore, the 1958 Congress did not believe that Indian tribes had
vested .property interests in Executive-order reservations and a fortiori did
not interpret the oil and gas leasing statute of 1927 as an act of recognition.
The federal district court given jurisdiction so implied when it observed in
dictum that
an unconfirmed executive order creating an Indian reservation conveys
no right of use or occupancy... beyond the -pleasure of Congress or the
President.... [A]s long as the lands in question had status only as ex-
ecutive order lands, the parties to this suit could have no interest therein
amenable to judicial determination.a
But, passing a possible distinction between "title" for purposes of amenability
to judicial process and "title" for purposes of compensability upon a govern-
58. E.g., Act of June 30, 1919, ch. 4, 41. Stat. 3 (1919) (typical appropriations act;
provisions relate to need not character of title, except for special treaty obligations) ; see
1927 House Hearings 90; id. at 103 (remarks of Commissioner Burke: 'Ve have always
consistently -taken the position that the Indians have the same rights in executive order
Indian lands as treaty lands."); cf. 34 Qps. A'TY', GEN. 171, 181 (1924) ("The important
matter here, however, is that neither the courts nor Congress have made any distinctions
as to the- character or ex-tent of the Indian rights, as between executive order reservations
and reservations established by treaty or Act of Congress.").
59. See, e.g., 64 Stat. 44 (1950), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 631-40 (1958), appropriat-
ing $88 million for capital improvements for the Navajo and Hopi Tribes although the
Hopi reservation was held by Executive order only. See Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp.
211, 215 (D. Ariz. 1959)).
60. See, e.g., 68 Stat 718 (1954), as amended, 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-564w (1958). These
statutes define tribal property as that property which %elongs to the tribe." See 63 Stat.
718 (1954), 25 U.S.C. § 564(a) (1958). The definition is based upon a report of the
Bureau of Indian Affairs stating that Executive-order reservations are held in trust for
the tribe by the Government. See H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 1-7, 23-25,
60-67 (1953).
61. Act of July 22, 1958, No. 85-547, 72 Stat. 403.
6Z See Healing v. Jones, 174 F. Supp. 211, 216 (D. Ariz. 1959) ("Here Congress
undertook by the enactment of the Act of July 22, 1958, to convey to certain Indians
equitable interests in the lands theretofore described in the executive order .... [There-
fore], from the date of that enactment, the ... [Indian tribes] had vested equitable in-
terest therein capable of judicial recognition ... ."); 104 Coxo,. RE 13066 (1958).
63. 174 F. Supp. at 216.
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mentAl taking, neither that court, nor any other, has considered the effect of
the 1927 statute. And no evidence exists that the 1958 Congress adverted to
the existence, let alone the title implications, of the 1927 act.0 4 The 1958 juris-
dictional statute was summarily considered and passed by Congress to allow
judicial settlement of an old and recurrent dispute 'between Indian tribes."8
Since no claim against the United States was involved, the Indian -Claims
Commission Act was inapplicable, and a special jurisdictional statute was
thought necessary to provide the tribes with access to the courts.0 0 The pro-
vision vesting rights in the litigant tribes was -probably included by the Indian
lawyers who drafted the statute 67 to prevent the district court from declining
jurisdiction on the grounds that the interests it was asked to adjudicate were
subject to extinguishment 'by fiat. Nevertheless, a committee report reasonably
indicates a congressional 'belief that Indian property interests were not vested
and an intent to convert "present interests" in the particular reservation into
title.68 Even so, if the 1927 'Congress recognized tribal property rights in Ex-
ecutive-order reservations, such a belief would be irrelevant; rights of use and
occupancy had already been transmuted into compensable interests, and the
1958 Congress was bound by its predecessor.
Tribal property interests in Executive-order reservations in Alaska are
affected by factors not relevant to comparable interests in the rest of the
United States. Although Indians in other states had 'been settled on reserva-
tions by 1919, most Alaskan natives then and now reside on land they claim
by immemorial possession. 69 In 1936, to protect them from an influx of white
settlers and to ensure continuance of their occupancy rights, Congress dele-
gated authority to the Secretary of the Interior -to designate reservations in
Alaska. 70 Pursuant to this statute, the Secretary 'has designated six reserva-
tions covering 1,540,600 acres of land.7' No court 'has decided whether tribes
on these reservations have compensable interests. In Hynes v. Grhnes Pack-
64. See H.R. REP. No. 1942, 85th 'Cong., 2d Sess. (1958); 104 CoNG. REc. 13066,
13196 (1958).
65. H.R. REP. No. 1942, supra note 64; 104 CONG. REc. 13196 (1958).
66. See H.R. RE,. No. 1942, supra note 64.
67. Ibid.
68. Ibid.
69. See 8 ALA. L. Ray. 170, 174 (1955).
70. 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958). For the purposes of the 1936
statute, see H.R. REP. No. 2244, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S. RaP. No. 1748, 74th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936). The 1936 statute made the Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 984
(1.934), 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-79 (1958), applicable to Alaska. The 'Wheeler-Howard Act
suspended the Indian General Allotment Act, 24 Stat. 388 (1887), as amended, 25 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1958), and provided for the incorporation of -Indian tribes, see 48 Stat. 984 (1934),
25 U.S.C. § 461 (1958). The reservations were necessary to give jurisdictional boundaries
to the incorporated tribe. H.R. REP. No. 2244, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1936),
71. S. REP. No. 1366, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1948); see H.R. REP. No. 2503, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 1386-99 (1952) (all reservations marked "DP" were designated pursuant
to the 1936 statute).
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ing Co.,72 however, Mr. Justice Reed noted in dictum that while the statute
was a valid delegation of authority to the Secretary of Interior to withdraw
public domain, it was not, in the absence of specific words of vesting, a dele-
gation of congressional authority to create compensable property rights.
But committee reports on the 1936 act state that the statute was intended
to fulfill a promise in the Act of May 17, 1884, that Congress will provide a
means by which Indians "may acquire title" to the lands they use and oc-
cupy. 73 In addition, courts have uniformly held that no specific words of vest-
ing are necessary to create vested equitable interests in reservations created
by statute or treaty using words similar to or identical with the language of
the 1936 statute.74 'Mr. Justice Reed distinguished these congressional enact-
ments on the ground that they dealt with specific claims and individual tribes
while the 1936 delegation to the Secretary of the Interior affected the entire
public domain in Alaska. General delegations of authority, however, have
iharacterized all Indian legislation since 1934.75 And the Secretary's authority
under the statute is carefully restricted to those lands previously reserved for
Indian use and occupancy or "actually occupied" by Indian tribes.76 Moreover,
the 'suggestion that designation of reservations does not vest property rights
72. 337 U.S. 86 (1949). The Packing Company sued the regional director of the Fish
and Wildlife Service, to enjoin enforcement of a regulation promulgated under authority
of the Alaska Fisheries Act (White Act), 43 Stat. 464 (1924), 48 U.S.C. §§ 221-28, 232-
34 (1958), which regulated fishing rights off the coast of Alaska. Id. at 8849, 100. The
regulation protected fishing rights of the Karluk Indians in coastal waters within a reser-
vation created under authority of the 1936 statute, 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. §358a
(1958). Id. at 89. Mr. Justice Reed upheld the validity of the reservation but denied the
validity of the regulation on the ground that it violated a clause in the White Act provid-
ing all parties with equal access to coastal waters for fishing purposes. Id. at 123, 127.
73. H.R. RE,. No. 2244, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936) ; S. RrP. No. 1748, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1936).
74. Compare 49 Stat 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958) ("designate as an Indian
reservation!'), with Treaty With the Wea Tribe of Indians, Oct. 2, 1818, 7 Stat. 186
("to be holden by the said tribe as Indian reservations are usually held") ; Act of May
28, 1937, ch. 283, 50 Stat 241 ("extended to include"), and Treaty With the Memomonee
Tribe of Indians, Oct. 18, 1848, 9 Stat. 952 ("to be held as Indians' lands are held").
The courts have uniformly interpreted such vague words as giving to the Indian tribes a
vested property interest. See, e.g., United States v. Klamath & Moadoc Tribes of Indians,
304 U.S. 119, 123 (1938) (treaty language: "held and regarded as an Indian resera-
tion"). See also Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 553 (1832) (Marshall, C.J.)
("hunting grounds").
75. See 'Wheeler-Howard Act, 48 Stat. 987 (1934), 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1958) (general
delegation of authority to the Secretary of Interior to incorporate tribes under constitu-
tions of their own choice); Indian Claims Commission Act, § 2, 60 Stat. 1050 (1946),
25 U.S.C. § 70a (1958) (general delegation of authority to the Indian Claims Commission
to hear all claims accruing prior to Aug. 13, 1946) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (1958) (general
delegation of authority to the Court of Claims to hear all claims accruing after Aug. 13,
1946) ; 18 U.S.C. § 1162 (1958) (general delegation of civil and criminal jurisdiction to
the states).
76. 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958) ; see United States v. Libby, Mc-
Neil & Libby, 107 F. Supp. 697, 700 (D. Alaska 1952).
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in affected tribes renders much of the 1936 statute nugatory. Since, under the
right of conquest theory, the Executive may protect the Alaskan natives'
unextinguished aboriginal right of use and occupancy against all 'but the sov-
ereign 7 7 designation of a reservation would not change tribal rights and would
render the statutory provision for tribal ratification of designated reservations
a sham. 78 Legislative intent as expressed in the committee reports on the 1936
statute, the general congressional policy, evidenced by the legislative history
of the 1927 statute, that tribes shall have compensable property interests in
all reservations regardless of origin, and the emasculating effect on the 1936
statute of a contrary construction, suggest the conclusion that Congress in-
'tended 'by delegating to the Secretary the authority to "designate reservations"
to create in 'him the power to vest equitable title in Alaskan tribes.
The 1936 statute and the oil and gas leasing act of 1927 create compensable
tribal property interests in Executive-order reservations in Alaska and the
other states respectively. This interpretation assures uniform treatment of
Indian property rights in treaty, statutory, and Executive-order reservations,
infuses meaning into the 1946 extension of jurisdiction to the Court of Claims
for Indian claims arising under "Executive Orders of the President," and, in
combination with such extension of jurisdiction, affords a meaningful and
needed protection -for an important source of Indian property interests.
77. E.g., United States v. Berrigan, 2 Alaska 442 (1905).
78. See 49 Stat. 1250 (1936), 48 U.S.C. § 358a (1958). 'Determination of the extent
of aboriginal rights of use and occupancy is difficult, see, e.g., Tlingit & Haida Indians v.
United States, 177 F. Supp. 452 (Ct. Cl. 1959), and negotiations culminating in tribal
ratification are a practical means of settling these Indian land claims.
